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STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF PAROLE
United States ex reL Johnson v. Chairman of New York State
Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974)*
In March 1973, the New York State Board of Parole refused peti-
tioner's application for parole1 and did not provide him with a statement
of the reasons for the decision.2 Petitioner filed a pro se petition seeking
an order compelling the board to furnish him a statement of reasons,'
and the district court found that, as a matter of due process, he was en-
titled to such a statement. 4  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed and held: The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
* After this issue went to press, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment in Johnson and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the cause as moot. Regan v. Johnson, 95 S. Ct. 488 (1974) (mem.).
1. Petitioner was imprisoned in 1966 in Auburn Correctional Facility, Auburn,
New York, under a 15- to 16-year sentence as a second-felony offender. He was noti-
fied of the parole denial on March 13, 1973. The effect of such a denial is generally
that the inmate must wait a year before receiving another interview with the parole
board. Petitioner was eventually released on parole on May 6, 1974, but the circuit
court opinion was not delivered until June 13, 1974. Neither the attorneys nor the
court learned of his release prior to the decision. See United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 926 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. In New York it is standard procedure not to give a prisoner a statement of the
reasons for denial of parole. After the parole board panel has left the institution, de-
nials are communicated to inmates on a form which gives neither reasons nor sugges-
tions. CITIZENS INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON NEw YoRK PA-
ROLE 78-90 (1973). For discussion of parole board practices in other jurisdictions see
Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law
and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243; O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making
Characteristics: Report of a National Survey, 8 CRM. L. BULL. 651 (1973) [herein-
after cited as O'Leary & Nuffield]; Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
282 (1971).
3. The prior litigation in this case is set out in the circuit court opinion, United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 926 (2d
Cir. 1974). It is worthwhile to note that the court treated petitioner's suit as one for
injunctive relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus, properly brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970), rather than for actual release from custody, the relief offered by a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). For a discussion of the difference,
see Priesser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249,
251 (1971) (per curiam). See also 40 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 1116 (1974); 42 FORDHAM
L. REv. 878, 880-81 n.31 (1974). Actions brought under § 1983 are not subject to the
requirement that state remedies be exhausted. Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967) (per curiam); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1962); Mon-
roe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180-83 (1960); see Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law
in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoner's Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473, 503-07
(1971).
4. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 363 F.
Supp. 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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requires that a state parole board furnish prisoners a statement of the
reasons for denial of parole.5
In recent years, there has been a noticeable trend toward extending the
principles of procedural due process to many areas previously thought
beyond the pale of constitutional protection.' While the sixth amend-
ment has traditionally provided safeguards in criminal prosecutions, 7 re-
cent cases in the postconviction area have been decided under the due
process clause. Determinations involving sentencing, 8 probation revo-
cation,' prison discipline,'" and parole revocation'- are now viewed as
5. United States ex tel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925, 934 (2d Cir. 1974).
6. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (revocation of welfare benefits); Willner v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (admission to the bar); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (revocation of security clearance of civilian engineer);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961) (expulsion of student from tax-supported college). See generally Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
7. The sixth amendment was applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The fourteenth amendment
due process clause has provided the basis for requiring procedural safeguards in proceed-
ings analogous to criminal prosecutions. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile
court trials); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (Colorado sex offender proceed-
imgs). For an explanation of the distinction between sixth amendment procedural
claims and fourteenth amendment due process claims, see 49 TExAS L. RPv. 798, 799-
800 (1971).
8. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See generally Note, Procedural Due
Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821 (1968).
9. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). It is unclear how much weight the
Mempa Court placed on the fact that, in the state of Washington, sentencing took place
at the same hearing in which probation was revoked. The Court stated: "[A] lawyer
must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or
a deferred sentencing." Id. at 137. Subsequent cases have relied on the sixth amend-
ment, see Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969); Ashworth v. United
States, 391 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), and on the fourteenth amendment,
ae Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
See Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole Release Decisions, 60 CALnW. L. Ruv. 1518,
1530-31 n.65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Parsons-Lewis]; 49 TEXAs L. REV. 798, 799-800
(1971).
10. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 196-98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1049 (1972) (transfer into segregated confinement); Carothers v. LaFollette,
314 F. Supp. 1014, 1026-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (revocation of prisoner's accumulated good
time). Because of the variety of prison disciplinary techniques, due process protection
has been extended on a case-by-case basis. See generally Parsons-Lewis 1520 n.13
(cases cited); Turner, supra note 3; Note, supra note 8, at 864-77.
11. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
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involving substantial interests12 deserving procedural protection."8  Tak-
sion in Morrissey, the circuit courts faced with this issue had generally refused to find
the due process clause applicable. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.
1971); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970);
Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Richardson v. Markley, 339 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 851 (1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 957 (1963). But see Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 409
(2d Cir. 1970) (dictum), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971); Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d
100, 105 n.5 (7th Cir. 1970) (dictum). Various courts have characterized parole as
a "privilege" rather than a "right," Hyser v. Reed, supra at 237, as a mere transfer of
custody, Rose v. Haskins, supra at 95; Menechino v. Oswald, supra at 406, or as a bar-
gained-for benefit in a contractual sense, Rose v. Haskins, supra at 93. The Morrissey
opinion rejected these characterizations but created a new difficulty in cases dealing with
parole release. See notes 52-53 infra and accompanying text.
12. The due process clause applies to government action which deprives persons, see
notes 52-53 infra and accompanying text, of interests within the meaning of the "liberty
or property" language of the fourteenth amendment. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (seizure of goods before hearing). It is necessary to resolve the threshold issue,
whether "due process" is required at all, before determining which particular procedural
safeguards must be provided. This threshold issue turns on the nature of the interest
involved, see id. at 84-85; Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudica-
tion-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kadish],
and, in some courts, on the "weight" or "gravity" of the interest, see Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Whether any procedural protections are due de-
pends on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss"').
The latter criterion, however, more properly relates to the determination of what proce-
dures constitute due process. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) ('The
extent to which procedural due process must be afforded . . . is influenced by the ex-
tent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss "); Parsons-Lewis 1546
n.150; note 13 infra.
13. "Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what proc-
ess is due. . . . [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
What procedures are required depends on a "complexity of factors," including "[ihe
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible bur-
den on that proceeding . . . ." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); see
Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). A particular pro-
cedure is required by due process if "the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
For a discussion of "procedural requirements" see Parsons-Lewis 1549. 'There are
a staggering number and variety of arguably applicable incidents of due process. They
fall within the four general categories of notice, hearing, counsel, and decision." Id.
(footnotes omitted). See Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 781-84 (N.D. Cal.
1971); Tobriner, Procedural Due Process in the Post-Conviction Period, in 4A CALIFoR-
NIA FoRMs oF PLEADiNo AND PRAC'ICE 1, 7-9 (1971); Note, Decency and Fairness. AnWashington University Open Scholarship
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ing a similar view, the court in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman
of New York State Board of Parole extended the principles of procedural
due process to parole release proceedings.
The parole board 14 and dissent 5 in Johnson argued that a previous
Second Circuit decision, Menechino v. Oswald,'6 was controlling author-
ity and mandated dismissal. The majority disagreed.' 7 While petition-
er,' like Menechino,' 9 sought a statement of reasons, the court stated
that Menechino viewed the statement only as a part of the "full panoply"
of "formal trial-type due process rights"20 which he sought as a "pack-
Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841, 871-77 (1971). Pro-
cedural requirements may stem from a statute or administrative rules as well as the Con-
stitution. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970). See also
King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974) (5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970) re-
quires Federal Parole Board to provide statement of reasons).
14. Brief for Appellant at 2, United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Petitioner's Brief for Cer-
tiorari at 9, New York State Bd. of Parole v. Johnson, - U.S. - (1974).
15. 500 F.2d at 935.
16. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). Menechino
was a New York state prisoner who argued that the parole board's decision denying him
parole was "'a denial of liberty, without. . . the minimum requirements of procedural
due process.'" Id. at 404. The district court dismissed the complaint, 311 F. Supp. 319
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), and the Second Circuit affirmed.
One court has construed Menechino as having denied the right to a statement of rea-
sons in parole release proceedings. Lewis v. Rockefeller, 431 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1970).
Other courts and authorities have construed Menechino as having denied the right to
any due process in parole release proceedings. See, e.g., Bridwell v. Ciccone, 490 F.2d
310 (8th Cir. 1973); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282-83 (5th
Cir. 1973); Candarini v. Attorney General of the United States, 369 F. Supp. 1132, 1135
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Bradford v. Weinstein, 357 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Klotz
v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 330 F. Supp. 665, 667 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Parsons-
Lewis 1520. A third group of courts have construed Menechino as denying only the
right to counsel at parole release hearings. See, e.g., Walker v. Oswald, 449 F.2d 481,
484 (2d Cir. 1971); Barnes v. United States, 445 F.2d 260, 261 (8th Cir. 1971); Heezen
v. Daggett, 442 F.2d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 1971); Sanchez v. Schmidt, 352 F. Supp. 628,
632 (W.D. Wis. 1973). Probably the best discussion of Menechino is found in 49
TEXAS L. REV. 798 (1971) (paraphrased extensively by Judge Mansfield in his opinion
in Johnson). See also 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 502.
17. 500 F.2d at 926.
18. Brief for Appellee at 1, United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State
Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
19. See note 22 infra.
20. 500 F.2d at 926-27. In Menechino, appellant sought
"(i) notice of charges, including a substantial summary of the evidence and re-
ports before the Board, (ii) a fair hearing, including the right of counsel, to
cross-examination and confrontation and to present favorable evidence and
755
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age."21 Thus, Menechino's request for a statement of reasons was sub-
ordinated to his interest in obtaining the right to counsel.22 The John-
son majority construed Menechino as holding that the "package" of pro-
cedural rights was inappropriate for a nonadversary parole release hear-
ing.23 Noting the disclosure purpose of a statement of reasons, the court
found the Menechino denial of a statement of reasons distinguishable. 24
The court then reasoned that a prisoner's interest in prospective parole
was within the meaning of "liberty" as used in the due process clause.25
The majority concluded 26 that the intervening Supreme Court decision
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 7 holding that due process required a hearing
upon revocation of parole,28 had superseded the Menechino reasoning
compel the attendance of favorable witnesses, and (iii) a specification of the
grounds and underlying facts upon which the determination is based ..
430 F.2d at 405.
21. 500 F.2d at 926-27; see 49 TExAs L. REv. 798 (1971). The interrelation of
the procedures sought suggests that Menechino viewed them "as a package." See note
22 inf ra.
22. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Menechino focused on the right
to counsel. 430 F.2d at 412, 419. It appears that on oral argument, Menechino either
subordinated his other claims to the right to counsel, or the other claims were "with-
drawn or waived." Id. at 419 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). See generally 49 T S L.
Rv. 798 (1971).
While Menechino sought only the right to have retained counsel present, the court
noted that unfairness would result if counsel were not provided to indigent prisoners.
430 F.2d at 410; cf. 49 TExAs L. Rnv. 798, 799 (1971) (footnotes omitted):
[C]ourts frequently assert that whenever the right to counsel attaches, the duty
to provide counsel for the indigent inexorably follows under equal protection
doctrines. . . . [C]ourts have predictably labored to avoid mandating counsel
at postconviction stages.
23. 500 F.2d at 926-27. The Menechino court stated that "the Board of Parole is
not [the inmate's] adversary. On the contrary the Board has an identity of interest with
him .... 430 F.2d at 407. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Palmero v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). See also note 41 infra. While, as the Johnson dissent argued, see 500 F.2d at
935, partial relief could have been granted in Menechino, see FED. R. Cxv. P. 54(c),
there is no indication that it was considered by the Menechino court. See 49 TExAs
L. REv. 798 (1971).
24. 500 F.2d at 926.
25. Id. at 927-28; see notes 12 & 13 supra.
26. 500 F.2d at 927.
27. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey dealt with a parolee whose parole had been
revoked without a hearing. The Court reasoned that "the liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty . . . . Mhe
liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 482. But see notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text.
28. Specifically, the Morrissey Court found that procedural due process required
both a preliminary and a final hearing. The minimal requirements at the final hearing
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that an inmate lacked "a private interest . . . of the type qualifying for
due process protection."2  The court saw no qualitative difference be-
tween an inmate's interest in prospective parole and a parolee's interest
in the present enjoyment of "conditional liberty." 30  Since "the stakes
are the same[,] conditional freedom versus incarceration," to distinguish
the proceedings would "create a distinction too gossamer-thin to stand
close analysis. 31
The Johnson dissent viewed Morrissey as having extended the due
process requirements only to interests presently enjoyed. 32  If Morrissey
was so limited, it did not supersede Menechino but rather strengthened
its mandate for dismissal.33 Significantly, neither the Morrissey Court
include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses ... ; (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing
body . . . ; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
408 U.S. at 489.
29. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 1970). Compare Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("Mhe liberty of a parolee, although indetermi-
nate ... is valuable, and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment"), with Menechino v. Oswald, supra at 408 ("Another essential element
missing is the existence of a private interest enjoyed by appellant, or to which he is en-
titled, of the type qualifying for due process protection").
30. 500 F.2d at 928.
31. Id. The majority reasoned that such a distinction would be "a reincarnation of
the right-privilege dichotomy in a not-too-deceptive disguise." Id. at 927-28 n.2. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972): "It is hardly useful any longer to try to
deal with this problem in terms of ... a 'right' or a 'privilege.'" The right-privilege
distinction has been attacked by commentators and all but discarded by the courts. See,
e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAv.
L. REV. 1439 (1968).
32. 500 F.2d at 936 (Hays, J., dissenting): "To insure that the holding of the case
would not be extended to those still incarcerated the Court [in Morrissey v. Brewer]
quoted .. . from the decision ...in United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State
Board of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879.
(1971) ...."
33. 500 F.2d at 936. Compare Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408 (2d Cir.
1970) ('The type of interest protected by procedural due process ...is usually one
presently enjoyed"), with Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("[A pa-
rolee's] condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison"). See also
United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971), quoted with approval in Morrissey v.
Brewer, supra at 482 n.8.
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nor the Johnson dissent relied on the word "deprive," as used in the due
process clause, 34 as the basis for the "presently enjoyed" distinction.
Even without explicit reference, it can be concluded that the Johnson
dissent would require deprivation as a prerequisite to due process pro-
tection. The Johnson majority, however, found government action af-
fecting "liberty" sufficient."3
Having concluded that "some degree of due process attaches to parole
release proceedings," the court found a statement of reasons "within the
process that is due an inmate . . . ."3 The court balanced 37 the in-
mate's "enormous"3 8 interest against the "apparently unfettered discre-
tion"' 39 exercised by the parole board. A statement of reasons would im-
pose an administrative burden, but the court showed little concern over
increasing the amount of time taken by the parole board to reach a de-
cision.40 A statement of reasons would facilitate judicial review41 of
decisions that were arbitrary or based on impermissible criteria, while not
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see notes 52-53 infra.
35. 500 F.2d at 928.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 928-29. In using the "weighing" test, the court cited the cases and phrases
listed in note 13 supra.
38. Id. at 929: "For [the inmate] the Board's decision represents the difference be-
tween incarceration and conditional liberty."
39. Id.:
mhe Board is an extraordinarily powerful administrative body, possessing vast
discretionary authority. It not only decides whether and when a prisoner will
be released on parole; it also decides in most cases when he will become eligible
for parole and, if parole is granted, the conditions of that parole.
See N.Y. CORREC. LAw § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1973):
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if
the board of parole is of opinion that there is reasonable probability that,
if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating
the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.
These extremely vague standards are representative of statutes in other states. See Daw-
son, supra note 2; O'Leary & Nuffield 658.
40. See 500 F.2d at 931-33. The average time spent by the parole board in making
decisions is less than six minutes. Id. at 931. On appeal, the state made no at-
tempt to show that the giving of a statement of reasons would impose any significant
burden on the parole board. The court noted, id. at 933-34, that a great number of
state parole authorities provided reasons. See O'Leary & Nuffield 658.
41. The primary function of a statement of reasons is to disclose sufficient informa-
tion about the decision to permit judicial review. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 94 (1943). In the absence of a statement of reasons for the decision, judicial
review is virtually impossible. See Tyler v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 19 Wis. 2d
166, 174, 199 N.W.2d 460, 466 (1963); Parsons-Lewis 1553-54; Comment, Thie Parole
System, 120 U. PA. L. Rv. 282, 368 (1971).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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disturbing the parole board's discretion to make subjective judgments or
establish permissible criteria. 42  The court felt that by enforcing the
proper limits of parole board discretion, aiding the decision-making pro-
cess, 43 and providing a basis for critical appraisal of parole release cri-
teria, 4 a statement of reasons would offer some minimal protection to
an inmate's interest in prospective parole.
To the Johnson court, a statement of reasons had to be extensive
enough to be meaningful, while not being so extensive as to create an
intolerable burden on the parole board. To satisfy the requirements of
minimal due process, the statement "should be sufficient to enable a re-
viewing body to determine whether parole has been denied for an imper-
missible reason or for no reason at all." 45 The statement need not in-
clude "detailed findings of fact";46 only the grounds for the decision 4 7
42. 500 F.2d at 930: "We recognize that parole decision-making should involve dif-
ficult and sensitive diagnosis and prognosis. . . based on application and weighing of
numerous factors of varying relevance." Though willing to respect the proper exercise
of administrative discretion, the court felt that review should be available if the parole
board followed a policy of denying parole "in so-called 'sensitive' cases where, despite
the Board's finding that the prisoner was sufficiently rehabilitated.. . release would stir
up unfavorable publicity," or where "because of the type of offense ... the prisoner
has not yet served an 'appropriate period'.. . ." Id. at 931. See Kastenmeier & Eglit,
Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise, and the Demise of Mythol-
ogy, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 477, 517-19 (1973). It is probable that such abuses are fre-
quent. See D. DRESsLER, PRcarcE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 111-12
(1959); REPORT OF TnE NEW YORK STATE SPEcIAL COMMSSION ON ATTICA 97 (1972).
Curbing abuses such as these would still leave the parole board free to exercise its discre-
tion within its proper scope.
43. 500 F.2d at 931-33. For a discussion of the manner in which a statement of
reasons "promotes thoughts by the decider," and compels him to "eschew irrelevancies"
and "cover the relevant points," see M. FRANKEL, CRImINAL SENTENCES 40-41 (1973).
The effect of this requirement may simply be to force the parole board to come to grips
with standards it may now unconsciously be employing. 500 F.2d at 930 n.4.
44. The results of such an appraisal would aid both reformers and "judges who exer-
cise their power to set minimum sentences .... ." 500 F.2d at 933. See Comment,
Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Den), Parole, 8 HARv. CV. RiGHrs-Crv. LiB.
L. REv. 419, 440-41 (1973).
45. 500 F.2d at 934.
46. Id. By not requiring such detailed findings of fact, the court avoided altering
the parole board's current practice of relying on materials supplied to it by prison au-
thorities. See CITIZENS INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON NEW
YORK PAROLE (1973). This significantly reduced the "burden" element to be weighed
in evaluating whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard. See note
13 supra.
47. 500 F.2d at 934. As an example, the court gave the following: "Mhat in its
view the prisoner would, if released, probably engage in criminal activity. .. ." Id.
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and "the essential facts upon which the Board's inferences are based"4
are required.
The Johnson opinion is commendable for the clarity of its analysis.
The majority opinion adequately distinguished Menechino.40 It recog-
nized the crucial importance of parole to an inmate, and properly em-
phasized the inmate's "stake" by declaring his interest to be within the
meaning of "liberty" as used in the due process clause. The court dis-
cussed only a statement of reasons, avoiding suggestive dicta about other
protective procedures.50 In finding that minimum due process requires a
statement of reasons, the court recognized the subjective, nonadversarial
qualities of parole board decision making. A statement of reasons could
be required because it was a procedure particularly appropriate for de-
terminations of this type. Finally, the court took care to define the re-
quired statement in terms of the judicial review of parole board discretion
that it is intended to permit.
The weakness of the Johnson opinion lies in its superficial discussion
of the "presently enjoyed" distinction. As Judge Mansfield wrote in
Menechino, "[the type of interest protected by procedural due pro-
cess . . . is usually one presently enjoyed . . . ."1 The fourteenth
amendment speaks of deprivation, not denial, 2 and the weight of auth-
48. Id. For example, "the prisoner's long record, prior experience on parole, lack
of a parole plan, lack of employment skills or of prospective employment and housing,
and his drug addiction ... ." Id.
49. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
50. Having determined that "some degree of due process attaches to parole release
proceedings," the court immediately proceeded to discuss the narrow issue of whether
a statement of reasons is within the process due an inmate. See 500 F.2d at 928. The
only discussion of other procedural rights was the court's explicit statement that Mene-
chino had not been overruled, an indication that those procedures appropriate only in
an adversarial determination (e.g., counsel, specificiation of charges, cross-examination)
will not be held to be constitutionally required in parole release hearings.
Future litigation, at least in the Second Circuit, will probably focus on other proce-
dures which facilitate judicial review, such as prompt notice of decision, more detailed
statement of reasons, access to files, and definition of "arbitrary" exercise of discre-
tion and "impermissible" criteria. This is evident from the substantial litigation con-
cerning procedural rights which followed the decision in Monks v. New Jersey State Pa-
role Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971) (statement of reasons required). See, e.g.,
Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 727 (1973) (consoli-
dation of several hundred appeals).
51. 430 F.2d at 408.
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added): "IIN]or shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
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ority has interpreted this to mean the loss of an interest.53 Morrissey v.
Brewer dealt with the rights of one already paroled, and held that gov-
ernment action which would deprive him of the "enduring attachments
of normal life" must comply with minimum due process.54
Application of the "presently enjoyed" reasoning, however, limits
what some authorities believe is the broad purpose of the due process
clause: to protect individuals against arbitrary or impermissible govern-
ment action that detrimentally affects them. A parole board's denial of
release on parole is detrimental to an inmate, and sufficiently so that
some guarantee of fairness should be required in the procedures. A
prisoner's continued incarceration withholds his liberty and the oppor-
tunity to develop the "attachments" spoken of in Morrissey.5 Presently
enjoyed freedom may be a more substantial interest than freedom merely
anticipated, but the latter is no less deserving of appropriate protection
from arbitrary or impermissible government action. Variations in the
nature of government determinations are sufficient reason to require dif-
ferent procedural safeguards, but not to deny them altogether. To the
extent that the Johnson decision curtails arbitrary or impermissible de-
53. "The Constitution contains no definition of the word 'deprive,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment. To determine its signification, therefore, it is necessary to as-
certain the effect which usage has given it, when employed in the same or a like connec-
tion." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1877). "Deprive" has been construed to
include temporary loss, McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lee
v. Thornton, 370 F. Supp. 312 (D. Vt. 1974), but not denial in its strict sense. In Mene-
chino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis added), the court made
this point: "[A] fundamental condition for requiring constitutional ... due process
is. . .an existing private interest." See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449
(1962) ("[wlhen society acts to deprive"). A violation of the due process clause de-
pends on "deprivation." Haines v. Askew, 368 F. Supp. 363, 372 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
atf'd. 417 U.S. 901 (1974); see Sturm v. California Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446,
450 (9th Cir. 1967) (Browning, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969);
Manos v. City of Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See generally Kadish,
supra note 12; O'Leary & Nuffield 621-22; Parsons-Lewis 1518; Reich, supra note 6; Van
Alstyne, supra note 31.
54. 408 U.S. 471, 482 n.8 (1972). The Supreme Court quoted language from
United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d
Cirj), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971), in which the circuit court stated that con-
ditional freedom is of greater importance than the "mere anticipation or hope of free-
dom." But as Judge Mansfield argued in Johnson, 500 F.2d at 927-28 & n.2, one in-
ference which can be drawn from that observation is not that parole release procedures
fall entirely beyond the reach of due process, but rather that different procedures will
satisfy the due process requirement. See also Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371
F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973).
55. 408 U.S. at 482.
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nials of parole, the result is laudable and sensible; to the extent that it
ignored the Word "deprive" in the fourteenth amendment, the Johnson
opinion is subject to criticism.
By treating the "presently enjoyed" distinction more extensively, the
Second Circuit could thus have strengthened its opinion. Nonetheless,
the decision can be expected to lend support to two arguments: that pa-
role release proceedings must conform to the principles of procedural
due process, 56 and that procedures other than a statement of reasons
are also required. 57 While the decision is not a total solution to the
shortcomings of parole release decision making, its impact on parole
authorities should be appreciable. The infusion of due process repre-
sented by Johnson is a significant step in the extension of the principles
of procedural due process.
56. In Cummings v. Regan, 45 App. Div. 2d 222, 357 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1974), the
court held that "due process considerations as well as the public policy of this State
require that a meaningful statement of reasons be furnished . . . ." Id. at -, 357
N.Y.S.2d at 263 (citing district court opinion in Johnson).
57. See note 13 supra,
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